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NOTES
Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Bennett v. City
of Slidell*
A liquor license applicant brought an action against the City of
Slidell and certain city officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983' to recover
damages caused by delays in issuing a liquor license and occupancy
permit for his lounge. The federal district court granted a monetary
judgment against the city and three of its councilmen, who subsequently
appealed. In a panel opinion, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the city had violated the applicant's rights to due process and equal
protection and was liable for damages caused by the delays in issuing
the license and permit. On rehearing en banc, the court reversed the
original panel opinion and held that the city could not be held liable
for the delays since the city officer was not acting with sufficient
authority to be considered an official within the intent of the civil rights
statute. Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1984).2
The Supreme Court first considered the issue of municipal liability
under the Civil Rights Acts of 1871, now 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in Monroe
v. Pape.3 In Monroe, the Court held that officers of local governments
could be held liable for civil damages under section 1983, 4 but that
municipal corporations were immune from liability since it found that
they were not "persons" within the meaning of the statute.' The Court
based its holding of municipal immunity on the legislative history of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, emphasizing the fact that the Sherman
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The author dedicates this casenote to her father, the author of the dissenting

opinion in Bennett, who offered much encouragement but no assistance.
I. Section 1983 provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,

or usage, of any state . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ...
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1983).

2. This case was considered by the Fifth Circuit on three separate occasions: a panel
(697 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1983)), sitting en bane (728 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1984)), and a per
curiam opinion (735 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1984) ). Additionally, at the time this Note was
written, a writ of certiorari was pending before the United States Supreme Court. 53
U.S.L.W. 3419 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1984) (No. 84-797). After completion of this Note, the Court
denied certiorari. 53 U.S.L.W. 3882 (U.S. June 17, 1985) (No. 84-797).
3. 365 U.S. 167, 81 S. Ct. 473 (1961).
4. Id. at 172-87, 81 S. Ct. at 476-84.
5. Id. at 191, 81 S. Ct. at 486.
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Amendment 6 which would have established municipal liability, failed to
pass. 7 Thus, the Court concluded, the "response of Congress to the
proposal to make municipalities liable . . . was so antagonistic that we
cannot believe that the word 'person' was used in this particular Act
8
to include them."
In the wake of Monroe, plaintiffs employed a number of strategies
to circumvent the municipal immunity doctrine. 9 Individuals seeking relief
for deprivations of their civil rights often resorted to another line of
cases that implied a cause of action cognizable in federal courts for
constitutional violations. They attempted to invoke the Fourteenth
Amendment directly, relying on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents.'
The Court in Bivens held that a plaintiff would be entitled to redress
his injury through the federal courts if he could demonstrate an injury
from a violation of his fourth amendment rights." A number of federal
courts used this rationale as a basis for sustaining jurisdiction in actions
against municipalities.' 2 As federal courts continued attempts to reconcile
the reality of damage caused by municipalities with the fact that the
Supreme Court had held these bodies not accountable, Bivens offered
a viable alternative to parties unable to obtain redress under section
1983.
Rather than constitutionalizing a cause of action against local governments using the Bivens rationale, in 1978 the Supreme Court overruled
Monroe insofar as it held that local governments were immune from
suit under section 1983. In Monell v. New York Department of Social
Services,'3 the Court reexamined the legislative history of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 and held that Congress intended that municipalities and
other local governmental entities be included among section 1983 "persons." ' 4 As a result, municipalities may be sued directly under section

6. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1871).
7. 365 U.S. at 187-91, 81 S. Ct. at 484-86.
8. Id. at 191, 81 S. Ct. at 486.
9. See, e.g., Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 93 S. Ct. 1785 (1973)
(Plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to circumvent the municipal immunity doctrine by bringing
a federal cause of action under §§ 1988 and 1983.); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S.
507, 93 S. Ct. 2222 (1973) (Plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought only injunctive and declaratory
relief for alleged deprivations of their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.); Aldinger
v, Howard, 427 U.S. I, 96 S. Ct. 2413 (1976) (plaintiff unsuccessfully asserted that
pendent-party jurisdiction was available to adjudicate state-law claims against a county
in federal court). For a thorough view of the expansion of the Monroe immunity doctrine,
see Levin, The Section 1983 Municipal Immunity Doctrine, 65 Geo. L.J. 1483 (1977).
10. 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971).
11. Id. at 397, 91 S. Ct. at 2005.
12. See, e.g., Roane v. Callisburg Indep. School Dist., 511 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1975);
Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 577 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976).
13. 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978).
14. Id. at 690, 98 S. Ct. at 2035.
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1983 "for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where . . . the
action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a
policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted
and promulgated by that body's officers.' 1 5 Furthermore, as the Court
subsequently decided in Owen v. City of Independence,16 municipalities
do not enjoy the qialified good-faith immunity that is sometimes granted
city officials.17
Section 1983 imposes liability on a municipality only for conduct
which subjects the plaintiff, or causes him to be subjected, to a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or other federal laws.'"
The interference with the plaintiff's rights must be due to a violation
for which the city government is itself responsible. In other words,
municipalities are liable under section 1983 only for deprivations caused
by unconstitutional official policies or customs. 9 To paraphrase the
Monell Court, Congress did not intend that a municipality be held liable
unless an action taken pursuant to official municipal policy caused a
constitutional tort.2" The Supreme Court has held that the official policy
must be "the moving force of the constitutional violation" to establish
liability under section 1983.21 But the Court has failed to delineate all
of the possible causes of action against municipalities under section
1983.22

As a practical matter, municipalities must delegate broad authority
to their officials in order to run smoothly,"3 and government decisions
and policies are necessarily made by individuals. The problem is to
decide which actions by which individuals should be characterized as
actions of the government for, "it is when execution of a government's
policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983."24
Difficult questions of what constitutes official policy have been raised
in a number of cases arising after Monell. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals recently struggled with defining the contours of official policy
25
in Bennett v. City of Slidell.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
Monell,
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id., 98 S. Ct. at 2035-36.
445 U.S. 622, 638, 100 S. Ct. 1398, 1409 (1980).
See Sheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974).
See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71, 96 S. Ct. 598, 604 (1976).
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325-27, 102 S. Ct. 445, 453-54 (1981).
436 U.S. at 691, 98 S. Ct. at 2036.
Polk County, 454 U.S. at 326, 102 S. Ct. at 454 (interpreting the Court in
436 U.S. at 694, 98 S. Ct. at 2038).
See Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d 220, 223 (5th Cir. 1983).
See Williams v. Butler, 746 F.2d 431, 438 (8th Cir. 1984).
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S. Ct. at 2037-38.
Supra note 2.
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Bennett sought damages from the City of Slidel12 6 for delays he
experienced in securing a liquor license and occupancy permit for his
lounge in Slidell, Louisiana. Under Louisiana law, the city council issues
liquor licenses. The trial court found that the Slidell city attorney had
been slow in reviewing the application and had ultimately advised the
council to delay issuance due to a legal question. Additionally, the city
building inspector had refused to issue an occupancy permit until Bennett
complied with a city ordinance requiring the blacktopping of a parking
area of proper size. This requirement had not been uniformly enforced.
The city attorney and building inspector also caused plaintiff's electricity
to be disconnected for a period of time. The Court of Appeals found
that the motivation for this unfair treatment was opposition to Bennett's
lounge from an adjacent property owner who was the city auditor and
who had openly boasted about his influence with the city.2 7 The court
held that to find the City of Slidell liable, city officials had to have
promulgated an official city policy: liability rests on the city government's
28
policy, not on the policies of individual officers.
The Court of Appeals, in a nine-five en banc decision, was unwilling
to hold the city liable for the acts of its city attorney and building
inspector although it did hold the city attorney personally liable. In
deciding whether their acts constituted official policy, the court concentrated on the acts of the building inspector. Since his actions were
the source of the controversy, this casenote will focus on that position.
As noted in Bennett, a municipality may violate a person's civil
rights in two ways: by the direct orders of the governing body, or by
setting a course of action for its employees which, when followed,
interferes with a constitutional right. A "course of action" may be set
by the body's promulgation of rules or ordinances, or by its acceptance
of the conduct of its employees.2 9 Such acceptance of conduct may be
attributed to the body in either of two ways: (1) actual knowledge may
be shown by open discussions at council meetings, or by written documents; or (2) constructive knowledge may be found if a body properly
exercising its responsibilities would have known of the violation.30 Therefore, a policy is that of the city if made by an official with the express
or implied authority of the governing body. And the conduct of the
official, "whether formally declared or informally accepted," must be
the policy of the governing body to be the basis for liability.'
r

26. Also named as defendants were members of the city council, the mayor, the chief
administrative office, and the city attorney. 697 F.2d at 658.
27. 728 F.2d at 765.
28. Id. at 769.
29. Id.at 767.
30. Id.at 768.
31. Id.at 767.
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In the per curiam opinion denying a petition for rehearing three
months after the en banc opinion, the court expressly stated that it
rejected the line of authority that would permit policy "to be attributed
to the city itself by attribution to any and all city officers endowed
with final or supervisory power or authority." 32 To promote consistency
in adjudication, the unanimous court offered a definition of official policy
in place of the "final authority" rationale:
A municipality is liable under 1983 for a deprivation of rights
protected by the Constitution or federal laws that is inflicted
pursuant to official policy.
According to the court, official policy is:
1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that
is officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality's lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers have
delegated policy-making authority; or
2. A persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted
and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to
constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy. Actual
or constructive knowledge of such custom must be attributable
to the governing body of the municipality or to an official to
whom that body had delegated policymaking authority.
Actions of officers or employees of a municipality do not
render the municipality liable under 1983 unless they execute
official policy as above defined.3"
In Monell, the Supreme Court expressly stated that a city policy for
which a city may be held liable may be made either by lawmakers or
by those "whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official
policy." 34 The Court thus intended to set a legal perimeter for city
liability. Unless the actions of officials were in accord with city policy,
the municipality would not be liable." In Monell, the issue was whether
a particular decision involved the making of policy, not the characterization of a position as that of a policymaker. An official formulating
a single unconstitutional policy is not outside the scope of Monell because
he does not frequently make decisions. On the other hand, an official

32. 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1984).
33. Id.at 862.
34. 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S. Ct. at 2037-38.
35. The Monell Court expressly excluded any municipal liability under § 1983 based
solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior. 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S. Ct. at 2036. For
a general discussion of § 1983 Municipal Liability and the doctrine of respondeat superior,

see Note, Section 1983 Municipal Liability and the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior, 46
U. Chi. L. Rev. 935 (1979).
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who does make city policy does not necessarily subject the city to liability
if he acts outside his authority.
But not all delegated authority is policymaking authority. If an
official is delegated authority and violates the Constitution in exercising
that authority, then the municipality faces liability.3 6 Monell's reference
to the "body's official decisionmaking channels'3 7 suggests that the
existence of an official policy should be determined by inquiring into
the municipality's rules and practices for delegating authority to make
decisions. The issue is whether an official had been delegated final
authority in that area.38
Consequently, the issue in Bennett, as in Monell, should have been
whether a particular decision made by the building inspector involved
the making of policy, rather than the characterization of his position
as that of a policymaker. Yet, instead of looking to see if the building
inspector has been delegated authority to act in this area, the Court of
Appeals concentrated on whether he had policymaking authority. According to the court, in order to be a policymaker, the governing body
must acknowledge that the official acts in lieu of the body "to set goals
and to structure and design the area of the delegated responsibility,
subject only to the power of the governing body to control finances
and to discharge or curtail the authority of the agent or board." 3 9 This
viewpoint seems to be contrary to the intent of the Court in Monell.
However, had the Bennett court examined the building inspector's
actions from the Monell viewpoint, it probably would have reached the
same result. It seems that the court felt that the building inspector's
actions did not represent official policy, regardless of whether he was
characterized as a policymaker. Rather his actions were those of an
40
individual officer and were not the policy of the city.
The Court of Appeals in Bennett found that no policymaking authority had been given to the building inspector. The court stated that
the inspector's job was to execute or administer the policy established
by the city council in its building code. His authority was derived from
the city's chief administrative officer, and his decisions were appealable
to the board of zoning adjustments and to the city council. The court
concluded that the inspector's decisions were "perhaps discretionary and
ministerial, but he had no authority to act in lieu of the council to set
'4
or modify city policy." 1

36. For a detailed analysis of this concept, see Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation
After Monell, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 213 (1979).
37. 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S. Ct. at 2036.
38. See generally Schnapper, supra note 36.
39. 728 F.2d at 769.
40. Id. at 769-70 (observing that there was no evidence that the unequal application
of the ordinance was a course of conduct attributable to the city council).
41. Id.at 769-70.
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The Bennett majority barred any municipal liability for the building
inspector's unconstitutional enforcement of the zoning ordinance on the
ground that the elected city officials had not authorized the inspector
to make official policy. But as previously noted, governmental entities
can act only through natural persons. It is only through their actions
42
that official authority may be exercised and official policies enforced.
As the Fifth Circuit had previously noted, "[alt some level of authority,
43
there must be an official whose acts represent govermental policy."
In an earlier case, the Fifth Circuit had said that where an official has
final authority in a given matter, his choice necessarily represents government policy. 44 Other circuits have followed this rationale. 45 The en
banc court in Bennett found that the building inspector was not the
final authority, and therefore that he had not acted in such a way to
make the city liable under section 1983. However, as the concurring
opinion in Monell stated, "[t]here are substantial line-drawing problems
in determining 'when execution of a government's policy or custom' can
be said to inflict constitutional injury such that 'government as an entity
is responsible under § 1983.' ' ' 46 Bennett falls into one of these linedrawing problem areas. The line may have been drawn in the wrong
place.
There is some question as to what actions represent "final authority." In Bennett, the majority of the court said that since the building
inspector's decisions were appealable, he did not have final authority.
But as the dissent indicates, the appealability of decisions should not
be the controlling factor. According to an earlier Fifth Circuit opinion,
Bowen v. Watkins, 47 if a higher official has the power to overrule an
official's action or decision, but as a practical matter never does, the
lower official may effectively have final authority in the area. Even
where there are appeals of an official's actions, if the appellate body
defers to the judgment of the official, then the decision of the official
may be viewed as government policy. 48 Another circuit has held that
even if an appellate process exists, the official may exercise authority

42. Id. at 771-72 (Politz, J., dissenting).
43. Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979, 989 (5th Cir. 1982).
44. Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 404 (5th Cir. 1980).
45. See, e.g., Rookard v. Health and Hosp. Corp., 710 F.2d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1983)
("Where an official has final authority over significant matters involving the exercise of
discretion, the choices he makes represent government policy."); McKinley v. City of Eloy,
705 F.2d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 1983) (City had delegated to the city manager the ultimate
responsibility for personnel decisions, and his actions therefore represented official policy.);
Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir. 1983) (Since the police chief was
responsible for the choice and implementation of department practices and procedures,
his acts and omissions reflected government policy.).
46. 436 U.S. at 713, 98 S. Ct. at 2047 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 694,
98 S. Ct. 2037-38).
47. 669 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1982).
48. Id. at 989-90.
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to set official policy if the appellate body only occasionally reverses his
49
decisions.
Following the prior jurisprudence of the Fifth Circuit, it appears that
the building inspector had sufficient authority to qualify as an official
making city policy under section 1983. The city council did not direct the
building inspector's day-to-day operations. The council was in a position to
review his decisions on appeal, but the record in Bennett showed his decisions to grant or deny occupancy permits were never challenged. His decisions were in effect final.5 0 In practice the building inspector had "unbridled
authority to enforce the zoning ordinance as he saw fit," 5 ' giving him final
authority to act on behalf of the city in situations requiring the exercise of
discretion. The city council designated him as the primary authority to interpret and enforce the zoning ordinance; he was the sole person given authority to grant or deny permits. In effect, his decision ended a matter; he
should thus be regarded as one "whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy" within the intention of Monell12 By enforcing the
zoning ordinance only after the filing of complaints, instead of applying it
uniformily to all, the building inspector's application of the ordinance deprived Bennett of his right to due process. Since the building inspector was
in fact the final authority, it appears that the line should have been drawn
at a different point, that his acts reflected city policy, and that the city should
have been held liable under section 1983.
Unfortunately, as noted above, the "final authority" rationale may no
longer be even arguable in the Fifth Circuit. In its per curiam opinion denying rehearing en banc, the court expressly rejected this rationale. This
analysis should not be overturned, for to do so "sounds a muted death
knell ' 5 4 of the intended application of Monell.
The Fifth Circuit first adopted the final authority, or ultimate repository of power, rationale in Familias Unidas v. Briscoe." In Familias Unidas, the official obtained his policymaking authority by virtue of his elected
office. The court stated that:
at least in those areas in which he, alone, is the final authority or
ultimate repository of county power, his official conduct and decisions must necessarily be considered those of one "whose edicts or
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy" for which the
county may be held responsible under section 1983.56

49. Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539, 1546 (11th Cir. 1984). Note that before October
1981, what is now the Eleventh Circuit was part of the Fifth Circuit.
50. 728 F.2d 772-73 (Politz, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 773 (Politz, J., dissenting).
52. Id. (quoting Monel, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S. Ct. at 2037-38).
53. 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1984).
54. 728 F.2d at 774 (Politz, J., dissenting).
55. 619 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1980).
56. Id. at 404 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S. Ct. at 2037-38).
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This rationale was repeated in a number of subsequent cases. In Schneider
v. City of Atlanta, 7 the court stated that whether a city had delegated final
authority in a given area to a given official is a question of fact to be
decided by the trier of facts."' In Van Ooteghem v. Gray,5 9 the court noted
that the only way a local governmental entity can establish official policy
is through the actions of an individual or group of individuals who possess
final authority. 60 A theory so deeply rooted in the recent jurisprudence of
the Fifth Circuit should not be cast aside so easily.
In the place of the "final authority" rationale, the court's per curiam
opinion offered the definition of "official policy." ' 6' Under this definition,
an action of an appointed official that is inconsistent with the city's written
regulations or undertaken without the knowledge of city policymakers is
normally attributable only to the official and cannot constitute official
policy within the meaning of Monell. This interpretation negates the possibility that municipal liability will be imposed for the unconstitutional acts
of an appointed official that are inconsistent with the city's written regulations, unless the acts are part of a widespread custom of which the municipality's governing body had actual or constructive knowledge.
Municipalities may thus frequently immunize themselves from liability under section 1983 for unconstitutional actions of their officials "merely by
articulating facially constitutional policies in the substantive areas in which
the officials perform their delegated duties." ' 62 In effect, Monell's standard
for municipal liability has no meaningful application outside a formally
adopted or announced policy that is facially unconstitutional. It is recognized, however, that widespread custom which is unconstitutional may be
grounds for liability under section 1983.63
By disregarding the final authority rational in defining "official policy," the Fifth Circuit has effectively limited the scope of Monell. It is
disturbing that the court cast aside such a recent doctrine in such an offhanded manner with so little explanation. Of course the Supreme Court
may properly define the scope of Monell. Since the circuits disagree on
Monell's interpretation6 the Supreme Court has an appropriate opportu-

57.

628 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1980).

58. Id.at 920.
59.
1981).

628 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1980), modified on other grounds, 654 F.2d 304 (5th Cir.

60. 628 F.2d at 494. For other Fifth Circuit opinions espousing the final authority
rationale, see Thomas v. Sams, 734 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1984); Hart v. Walker, 720 F.2d
1443 (5th Cir. 1983); Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1982).
61. See supra text accompanying note 33.
62. 728 F.2d at 771 (Politz, J., dissenting).
63. Discussion of custom is beyond the scope of this casenote. See generally Schnapper,
supra note 36.
64. See, e.g., Williams v. Butler, 746 F.2d 431, 437-38 (8th Cir. 1984) (The Eighth
Circuit rejected the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Bennett, distinguishing Bennett from Williams
on narrow grounds.).
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nity to intervene to explain just what actions constitute official policy. In
confronting this question, the author submits that the Court should extend
Monell's application beyond the contours expressed by the Fifth Circuit in
Bennett; otherwise Monell's prescription for municipal liability would be
practically meaningless. To avoid a situation where a victim of an unconstitutional application of a municipal ordinance is faced with a choice between suing a municipality which is immune because the ordinance is
consistent with constitutional norms, and suing an official who may be
immune,6 51 the Court should recognize a more expansive view of Monell
than was recognized by the Fifth Circuit in Bennett. If an official who is
the final or ultimate repository of authority violates a person's constitutional rights, the municipality should be liable to that person under section
1983.
Jane Geralyn Politz

65.

728 F.2d at 774 (Politz, J., dissenting).

